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All is  not well down  on the farm.  Net farm 
income has dwindled from an alltime  high  of 
$30 billion in 1973 to about $20 billion in 1977, 
which underscores the financial difficulties that 
many farmers  are facing.  Although  the farm 
income  picture  has  recently  improved 
somewhat  due  to  higher  market  prices  and 
additional Government  benefits,  a  number of 
farm operators are still struggling to put their 
financial affairs in order. 
Several  approaches  can  be  used  to solve  a 
farm income problem. During the early months 
of  1978,  for  example,  a  group  of  protesting 
farmers advocated one particular solution  that 
was  very  interesting:  parity.  In simple terms, 
these farmers were saying that the prices they 
receive for their products should change in step 
with changes in the prices of goods and services 
which they buy. Therefore, they said, a  policy 
of parity prices was needed. 
Although  many  people  were  introduced  to 
parity for the first time as a result of  the farm 
strike, the concept is  not  new.  It has been an 
integral  part of  farm  policymaking for a  long 
time.  During  the  post-World  War  I  period, 
some observers saw a deteriorating relationship 
between agriculture and the U.S.  economy and 
decided to examine the situation  more closely. 
Government  statisticians  had  been  collecting 
data on the prices of farm products and other 
commodities  for  a  number of  years,  and  the 
existence  of  these  data,  together  with  the 
studies  that  followed,  ultimately  led  to  the 
parity concept. 
A person who contributed importantly to the 
development  of  parity  was  George  Peek,  a 
manufacturer  of  farm  machinery.  In  1922, 
Peek was disturbed about the growing inability 
of farmers to buy tractors and other production 
inputs, and thus he advanced the idea that the 
purchasing  power  of  farmers  needed  to  be 
protected  through the prices they received  for 
their products.'  His idea was originally named 
"fair exchange value," and it basically  meant 
that  for  each  bushel,  pound,  or  bale  of 
whatever  farmers  sold  on  the  market,  they 
should  be  able  to buy  as  many  inputs  and 
consumption  items  as  they  had  done  in  an 
earlier  period.  Thus, the purchasing  power of 
farm  products  would  remain  the  same  over 
time. 
Not  surprisingly,  Peek's  parity concept  was 
popular with farmers. Moreover, parity quickly 
became  a  political  issue  during  the  farm 
protests of  the 1920's that ultimately  produced 
the McNary-Haugen farm  bills.  In 1933, 
A brief history on the evol'ution of parity can be found in 
John D. Black, Parity. Parity, Parity (New York: Da Capo 
Press, 1942), pp. 45-66. 
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officially adopted the parity concept  and  over 
the  years  it  has  continued  as  a  permanent 
fixture in all new farm legislation.  However, in 
recent years the idea  has been  more symbolic 
than real as a policy goal. 
As  a  concept,  parity  connotes fairness  and 
equality. But the concept also raises a number 
of legitimate questions. .For example, are parity 
prices  truly fair for farmers,  consumers,  and 
taxpayers alike? Are 100 per cent parity prices 
really  comparable  with  similarly  computed 
prices  for  earlier  years?  How  would  parity 
prices affect the future structure of agriculture, 
retail  food  prices,  and  Government  outlays? 
From the debates in  Congress  and  articles  in 
newspapers, one can conclude that few  people 
really understand the parity concept. Thus, the 
purposes of  this article are twofold:  to define 
parity %in  a meaningful  way  and to analyze its 
implications for agriculture and for the general 
economy. 
HOW PARITY IS CALCULATED 
Parity is an equity concept. To illustrate the 
concept:  if  the  proceeds  from  the sale  of  50 
bushels  of  wheat  were  sufficient  to  purchase 
one  ton  of  fertilizer during  the  1910-14  base 
period;  then  with  parity  pricing,  the  same 
relationship  should  hold  today.  The  U.S. 
Department  of  Agriculture  (USDA)  has 
attempted  to quantify  this  equity  concept  of 
parity by  comparing the ratio of  price indexes 
at the present  time to the  ratio  of  the same 
indexes during the 1910-14  base  period.  Two 
measures  of  parity  are  commonly  calculated 
and widely used-they are the parity ratio and 
parity prices for specific farm commodities. 
The  parity ratio is  simply  the  ratio  of  the 
Index  of  Prices  Received  by  Farmers  to  the 
Index  of  Prices  Paid  by  Farmers  for 
Commodities and Services, Interest, Taxes, and 
Farm  Wages.  Using  January  1978  data,  the 
calculation of the parity ratio is as follows: 
The Index of Prices 
The  Received by Farmers 
Parity =  .  . 
Ratio  The Index of'Prices 
Paid by Farmers 
465 per cent [with 
65  1910-14 = 1001 
per = 
cent  710 per cent [with 
1910-14 = 1001 
An adjusted parity ratio is also computed  and 
published  by  USDA  in  Agricultural  Prices. 
This adjusted ratio incorporates into the Index 
of  Prices  Received  by  Farmers supplementary 
income from Government farm programs. 
Consequently,  whenever  such  supplementary 
income  is  being  received  by  farmers  the 
adjusted  parity ratio is  somewhat higher  than 
the unadjusted  parity ratio. 
Though widely used  as a general  barometer 
of agriculture's well being, the parity ratio is a 
measure  of  price  relationships  and  nothing 
more. It does not measure farm income, farmer 
purchasing power,  or farmer welfare.  Because 
any index series must be predicated on a  base 
period,  the 1910-14 period  was  chosen  as the 
base for the parity  ratio because the relation- 
ship between  agriculture  and  the  rest  of  the 
economy seemed to be in proper balance then. 
If indeed this was true, Chart 1 shows that this 
standard  has  not  been  achieved  at any  time 
during  the  intervening  years  except  during 
periods of war. 
Parity prices are calculated for a wide range 
of  individual  agricultural commodities.  These 
parity prices have often been used in the past to 
determine Government support prices for farm 
commodities-as  is  presently  the  case  with 
milk:  The  parity  price  for  a  commodity  was 
originally  calculated  in  the  following  way.  A 
"base  price"  for  a  commodity-the  average 
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SOURCE: Agricultural Statistics, U.S. Department of  Agriculture, 1967, p. 508, and 1977, p. 458. price for the 60 months from August  1909 to 
July  1914--was  multiplied  by  the  "parity 
index
v-the percentage change in the Index of 
Prices  Paid  by  Farmers  since  1910-14:2, For 
example, the July 1949 parity  price for  wheat 
was calculated as follows: 
The Parity Price = [The Base Price] x 
[The Parity Index (1910-14 = 100)] 
$2.16 per bushel = ($0.884 per bushel) x 
(244 per cent) 
The parity price is calculated in terms of prices 
received  by  farmers  in  the  local  markets  in 
which they ordinarily sell.' 
Over  time,  however,  the  original  parity 
formula  was  regarded  as  increasingly  dated. 
Thus,  to  better  reflect  current  commodity 
prices  in  the formula,  the Agricultural  Act  of 
1948  provided  that  a  "new  parity"  formula 
would  be used  beginning on January 1,  1950. 
The "new  parity" formula  incorporated  only 
one  major  change  from  the old  formula:  an 
"adjusted  base  price" was  calculated  using  a 
moving  10-year  average  of  prices  received. 
Thus, the average  price for the commodity in 
question for the most recent 10-year period was 
divided  by  the average  of  the Index  of  Prices 
Received by Farmers for the same 10 preceding 
years to obtain the adjusted base price. 
This new formula was phased into use over a 
number of  years so that the adjustment  from 
the "old parity" price to the "new parity" price 
was  gradual  in  those  cases  in  which  the  new 
formula resulted  in  lower  prices  than the old 
formula.'  For  many  commodities  the  new 
parity  price  was  lower,  but  for  some  it  was 
2 The  base  prices for certain other commodities,  such  as 
tobacco and .some  fruits  and  vegetables,  were  based  on 
somewhat different time periods. 
3 Agricultural Prices, U.S.  Department of Agriculture, July 
1949, pp. 23-25. 
4 Agricultural Prices, January 1950, pp. 49-53. 
higher.  The  parity  price  for  wheat  in 
1950-$2.20  per  bushel  under  the  old 
formuladeclined  to  $2.13  under  the  new 
formula.  But  in  the case  of  milk,  the  parity 
price rose  from  $3.98  to $4.31  per  hundred- 
weight with the new formula. 
Parity  prices  for  all  farm  commodities  are 
now  calculated  using  the  same  two-step 
formula.  To  illustrate,  the  parity  price 
computation for  corn  based  on January  1978 
data is as  follow^:^ 
120-month  (January  1968 - 
December  1977)  Average  of 
Prices  Received  by  Farmers 
A) Adjusted  = for Corn
6 
Base price  Average  Index  of  Prices 
~eceived  by  Farmers for the 
same 120-month period (1910 
-14 = 100) 
$1.88  Adjusted  - 
-  $0.495 per bushel. 
~ase  Price  380 
B) Parity Price = [Adjusted  Base Price] x 
[The Parity Index (1910-14 = loo)] 
Parity Price = ($0.495 per bushel) x 
(706 per cent) = $3.49 per bushel. 
The Indexes of Prices Received and of Prices 
Paid  by  Farmers  have  also  been  periodically 
adjusted to more accurately reflect the current 
mix of products produced and of inputs used in 
farm  production.  Agricultural  commodities 
have  been  added  to  the  Index  of  Prices 
Received  as  they  have  become  commerciaily 
important. Other products have been  dropped 
from  the  index  or  combined  under  different 
5  Agricultural  Prices. January 1978, pp. '25-26. 
6 Both 120-month averages have been adjusted to allow for 
unredeemed loans and other supplemental  payments 
resulting from price support operations. 
6  Federal Rese~e  Bank of Kansas City product designations. The Index of Prices Paid 
has  also  been  updated  over  time  to  include ' 
farm  wages,  taxes  on  farm  real  estate,  and 
interest on  farm  real  estate  debt.  The  index 
numbers reported for each of  the two indexes 
are  weighted  averages  of  the  prices  for  the 
various index components. Consequently, it has 
been  necessary to update the weighting of  the 
index  components  a  number  of  times  since 
1933.  The  two  indexes  presently  reflect  the 
relative  importance  of  products  and  inputs 
from a 1971-73 sample  period.  Since January 
1977, however, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
for Family Living has replaced the family living 
section of the Index of Prices Paid by  Farmers.' 
Table 1 contains  the components included in 
both the Indexes of  Prices Received  and Prices 
Paid  by  Farmers  along  with  the  weighting 
mechanisms  developed  from  the  most  recent 
base period (1971-73). 
WHAT PARITY IS AND ISN'T 
The subject of  parity has periodically caused 
lively debate. Central to these debates has been 
the question of  what  parity really is-in  other 
words,  what  does  the concept  (and  formula) 
actually  measure?  In  theory,  it  should  be 
relatively  simple  to  reach  agreement  on  this 
.question but, in  reality, it has been impossible. 
For example, farm groups and their supporters 
have  often  clung  to  interpretations  of  parity 
that are at odds with the official definitions and 
generally accepted interpretations. Conse- 
quently, it is  useful once again to review  what 
parity is-and  what it is not. 
The  parity  price  for  a  commodity  is  that 
price  which  would  give  a  unit  of  that 
commodity  the same  relative  purchasing 
power-in  terms of goods and services bought 
by  farmers-that  it  had  during  1910-14-if, 
Agricultural Prices.  January 31, 1977, y. 44. 
and  only  if,  everything  else  remained 
unchanged. In other words, parity assumes no 
geographic changes in'production patterns, no 
changes  in  farm  sue,  and  no  technological 
changes that alter production processes or the 
productivity of  resources over time. 
But  dramatic  changes  have  occurred  in 
agriculture since the 1910-14 base period. The 
resources used in production are often different 
and frequently more productive than they were 
during  the  base  period.  Additionally,  the 
productivity of  some crops has increased more 
rapidly than others. Table 2 indicates changes 
in yields per acre that have occurred since 1910 
for  some  major  crops.  It  is  important  to 
remember that the parity  price  formula  does 
not  explicitly  account  for  these  productivity 
changes in agriculture. Moreover, such changes 
are not accounted for implicitly by  the parity 
price in any well defined or consistent manner. 
The  most  serious  criticism  of  the  parity 
formula  is  that  it  does  not  account  for  the 
changes in agricultural  productivity.  And  the 
changes  have  been  substantial.  Table  2 
illustrates a 234 per cent increase in the average 
yield per acre for corn from 1910-14 to 1972-76. 
It  must  be  recognized,  of  course,  that  the 
resource mix presently used in corn production 
has  changed  since  the  1910-14  base  period. 
More  machine  power  and  agricultural 
chemicals  are  used  now,  along with  far  less 
animal  power  and  manhours  of  labor. 
Nonetheless,  the  vast  changes  in  plant 
breeding,  farm  equipment  design,  chemical 
technology,  and  other  production  techniques 
have  also  combined  to  make  the  present 
resources more productive. What has happened 
in  corn production is not unique.  All  of  U.S. 
agriculture  is  more  productive  and  efficient 
than in 1910-14. 
The  significance  of  these  gains  in 
productivity is lost in  the parity formulations, 
however.  Clearly, if  productivity is  increasing, 
the price that a farmer receives for his product 
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Potatoes,  sweet  potatoes, 
and  dry edible beans 
:  . 
I 
All  crops 
Meat  animals 
Dairy  products  , 
Poultry  and  eggs 
Livestock  and  livestock 
products 
All farm  products 
1971  -73 Weights 
Per  Cent  Commodity  Group 
Family  living 
Food  and  tobacco 
Clothing 
Housing 
.Autos and  auto  supplies 
Medical  and  health  care 
Education,  recreation, 
and  other 
1971  -73 Weights* 
Per  Cent 
Production 
Feed 
Feeder  livestock 
Seed 
Fertilizer 
Equipment  and  supplies 
Motor  supplies 
Motor  vehicles 
Farm  machinery 
Building  and  fencing  materials 
Farm  services  and  cash  rent 
Total commodities and  services  .  88.0 
Interest  4.0 
Taxes  2.8 
Wage  rates  5.2 
Commodities-and services,  interest, 
taxes,  and  cash  wage  rates  100.0 
'Weights  used currently and for revisions starting January 1965. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of  Agriculture.' 
does not have  to rise proportionately  with the  comparable  to  those  in  a  base  period  with 
prices he pays for inputs in order to maintain  progressively  lower  parity  price  levels. 
his purchasing power.  Stated differently,  it is  Supporting  this  assertion,  Professor  B. H. 
possible  for resources to earn rates  of return  Robinson of Clemson University notes: 
8  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Table 2 
AVERAGE CROP YIELDS PER  ACRE 
191  0-1  4, 1972-76" 
Per  Cent 
1910-14  1972-76  Change  - - 
Corn  (bushelslacre)  26.0  86.7  234 
Wheat (bushelslacre)  14.3  30.6  114 
Cotton  (poundslacre)  200.3  477.2  138 
1924-28 
Soy beans  (bushelslacre)  11.9  26.6  124 
'Soybean  yields are for 1924-28 and  1972-76. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of  Agriculture. 
If a total net farm income  index is 
calculated  using,the 1910-14 period 
as a base, . . . one finds that as the 
gap  between  parity  prices  and 
market  prices  has. increased- 
(parity prices moving up and market 
prices moving down)-the index  of 
total  net  farm  income  has  also 
increased. The relationship suggests 
that other factors have changed and 
that  the  .official  parity  price 
calculations may be mi~leading.~ 
Furthermore,  Professor  Luther  Tweeten  of 
Oklahoma State University reports that: 
8 Congressional  Research  Service,  Parity  Prices  for 
American  Agriculture.  The  Library  of Congress, 
Washington,  D.C.,  February  21,  1978,  Appendix  I, 
Statements  by  Dr.  B. H. Robinson,  Clemson  University; 
and Dr. Luther Tweeten, Oklahoma State University. 
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Adequate-size, well-managed  farms 
now on the average require approxi- 
mately 75 per cent of 1910-14 price 
parity  to  cover  all  costs  of 
production  including  land  at  its 
current value and a  rather generous 
return to the operator and family for 
labor,  risk,  management,  and 
eq~ity.~ 
Parity  prices  do  not  measure  total  farm 
purchasing  power  or  farmers'  economic 
welfare.  For example, the personal  income of 
farm  people  includes  a  substantial  and 
increasing amount of nonfarm income.  In fact, 
almost  60  per  cent  of  the  total  earnings 
accruing to all U.S.  farm people in 1976 came 
9 Ibid. 
9 from off-farm  source^.'^ Off-farm income is an 
increasingly  important  component  of  personal 
income for commercial farmers. as well  as for 
part-time  and  small  farmers.  Farms .' with 
annual sales  of  $40,000-$99,999  received 
almost  30  per  cent  of  their  income  from 
nonfarm sources and among the largest farms 
(those with annual sales of  $100,000 or more) 
the figure was 19 per cent. 
Farmers are correct  in  asserting that parity 
prices do not necessarily guarantee a  profit to 
all producers. The cost structure of agriculture 
varies widely from one farm to the next as well 
as over time, depending upon the efficiency of 
the  farm  operation,  the  farmer's  tenure  in 
business, the size of the debt load that must be 
serviced,  and  weather  conditions.  Of  course, 
when a farmer  has little product to sell-as  a 
result of drought or hail, for example--parity 
prices  will  not  guarantee  a  profit.  The other 
side  of  this  argument  is  that the  larger  and 
more  efficient  the farm,  the  more  beneficial 
parity pricing is  likely to be.  A small  farmer 
may  need  prices  substantially  greater  than 
parity to achieve an equality of  income with  a 
city counterpart  having comparable education 
and  business investment.  On the other  hand, 
the  larger  farmer  will  likely  discover  parity 
prices  will  yield  an  income  substantially  in 
excess of  a  city counterpart  with  comparable 
education and business investment." 
On  balance,  parity  pricing  presently  has 
serious  problems  in  both  interpretation  and 
implementation.  The formulations are becom- 
ing  increasingly  dated  and  can  be  seriously 
faulted  for  not  accounting  for  changes  in 
agricultural production patterns or technologi- 
10 Agriculturd Outlook, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Washington, D.C., September 1977, pp. 16-21. 
11 Luther Tweeten, Foundations of Farm Policy  (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press,  1970), pp. 163-67. 
cal developments.  Although  parity  prices 
probably  have  some  modest  validity  as  a 
general barometer of  farm price relationships, 
they are subject to much misuse and misinter- 
pretation.  These  problems  often  result  in 
incorrect public policy formulation  and further 
depreciate the limited  usefulness  remaining in 
the parity pricing concept. 
THE IMPACT OF PARITY PRICING 
Circumstances this past winter forced  public 
policymakers to seriously consider-for the first 
time since the early 1950's-the  implications of 
legislation providing farmers with 100 per cent 
of parity. According to some proposals, farmers 
who  elected  to  idle  up  to  half  of  planted 
acreage would  be guaranteed  100  per cent of 
parity.  Under other  proposals,  this  guarantee 
would  have been  mandated  and  accompanied 
by compulsory quotas and production controls. 
On  the  surface,  the  proposals  seem  so 
appealing that people may be tempted to forego 
thoughtful  analysis.  This  would  be  a  serious 
mistake. For despite the intuitive appeal, these 
proposals  carry  the  seeds  of  serious  future 
problems for both farmers and consumers. 
Admittedly, a policy providing a guarantee of 
100 per cent of parity would have an immediate 
and substantial impact on  both  gross  and  net 
farm income.  Cash  receipts  could  increase  by 
over $40 billion and  realized  net farm income 
might rise as much as $20 billion above current 
levels  by  1982-83.  However,  most  of  this 
increase in income would go to a small number 
of larger farmers. In 1976, less than 6 per cent 
of the nation's farms received 60 per cent of the 
cash receipts from farming, 39 per cent of  the 
realized  net  income,  and  36  per  cent  of  the 
direct Government payments. 
The  USDA  estimates  that  if  target  prices 
were raised to 100 per cent of parity, about $15 
billion  in  Government  payments  would  be 
10  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City required for just corn, wheat,  and cotton.12 If 
the 6 per cent of farms with sales over $100,000 
received  the  same  36  per  cent  of  direct 
Government  payments  under  a  100  per  cent 
parity  regime,  the average  payment  per  farm 
would  be  $35,300.  The  2  million  farms  with 
sales under $20,000 would  receive 24  per cent 
of  the payments, or $1,773 per farm. The fact 
remains, therefore, that 100 per cent of  parity 
will  not  solve  the  income  problems  of  most 
American farmers because they do not market 
enough  to benefit  from  either  greatly  higher 
product prices or target prices. 
The National Economy 
The farm economy is  only  one  part-albeit 
an important  onmf  the  national  economy. 
Thus,  farm  policy  must  be  analyzed  in  the 
context  of  its  impact  on  national  economy. 
Parity  pricing  for farm  products  would  have 
unfortunate  short-term  and  long-term  effects 
on the national economy. The USDA estimates 
that retail food  prices would  rise about 20 per 
cent during the first year of  parity pricing and 
after  that  would  return  to  a  lower  rate  of 
increase,  but nonetheless would  increase  each 
year  as  parity  prices  and  various  marketing 
costs  rose.  The  impact  of  higher  food  prices 
would  likely  reduce  the  real  gross  national 
product growth rate and raise the rate of  price 
inflation from what they otherwise would be by 
about  half  a  per  cent  per  year  in  1978  and 
1979. Unemployment would likely rise modestly 
with  parity pricing as well, up by about half a 
per  cent  by  the  end  of  1979.13 While  food 
consumption  would  decline  somewhat,  the 
consumption of red meats would be reduced to 
the lowest  level  since  the mid-l%0's.  Similar 
projections  are  made  by  Data  Resources, 
1nc.-an  economic  forecasting  firm."  Their 
model  results  indicate  that,  for  the  years 
1978-80, full  parity  pricing would  result in a 
CPI  increase  of  8 per  cent  over  the forecast 
base,  employment  cuts  of  800,000  with  an 
unemployment increase of 0.6  per cent, and a 
reduction  in  real  disposable  income  of  $22 
billion. 
Export Markets 
U.S.  farmers have  enjoyed  remarkable 
growth in export sales for their products during 
recent  years.  Indeed,  about  one-third  of  the 
harvested acres in the United States have been 
used  to  supply  this  market.  Parity  pricing 
would  bring  about  marked  declines  in 
agricultural export volumes for most important 
agricultural exports-as much as 13 per cent in 
each  of  the first  two  years  of  parity  pricing, 
according  to USDA  estimates.  Although 
volume would decrease at first, it would  begin 
to  recover  within  five  years,  assuming  that 
production  adjustments  in  other  parts  of  the 
world  would  take  place  within  that  time. 
Consequently,  after 1982  U.S.  farmers  would 
begin once again to share in increases in world 
agricultural  trade.  The  USDA  estimates  that 
the  value  of  U.S.  agricultural  exports  would 
likely increase  by  as much as $10 billion over 
the current level  by  1982-83. l5 However,  most 
experts are not so sanguine about the effect of 
parity pricing on export markets.16 Dr. D. Gale 
Johnson, at the University of Chicago, sums up 
the concern shared by others when he notes: "It 
l2  Congressional Research Service, pp. 22-24.  l4  Congressional Research Service, Appendix I, Statement 
13  ..Analysis  of  American  Agricultural  Movement  by  Otto Eckstein, President of Data Resources, Inc. 
Proposal," Issue  Briefing  Paper,  prepared by  Economics,  lS  USDA Issue Briefing Paper* Pp. 
Statistics, and  Cooperative  Services, U.S.  Department of  16 Congressional  Research  Service,  pp.  38-39  and 
Agriculture, Washington, D.C., March 3, 1978.  Appendix I. 
Economic Review..  June 1978.  11 is simply wrong to assume that we could retain 
our export  markets-if  our export  prices 
reflected  100  per  cent  of  parity." An  added 
complication  for  U.S.  farmers  is  likely. 
Prohibiting the entry of  agricultural  products 
into the United States at less than 100 per cent 
of  parity  prices-quivalent  to the  European 
Economic Community's  variable levies-would 
no  doubt  result  in  a  proliferation  of  trade 
barriers against U.S.  agricultural exports. 
Land Values 
Parity  pricing for  farm  commodities-with 
sharply higher farm earnings-would  result in 
returns'being earned by farmland in excess of 
those  needed  to  keep  land  in  production. 
Depending on the commodity in  question and 
the production quotas established,  some land 
owners  would  fare  much  better  than  others. 
Little imagination is  required  to describe the 
outcome of  such a situation.  Farmland  prices 
would rise rapidly as the increased earnings are 
bid  into  the  value  of  farmland.  The  USDA 
suggests that with  100 per cent*of  parity, land 
values could increase as much as 12 to 14.5 per 
cent per year over the next five  years."  These 
rates are well in excess of  the'historical rates of 
increase in farmland  values-the  rate of  price 
inflation  plus  1  or  2  per  cent.  Thus,  a 
disturbing cycle could be set in motion in which 
higher  land  prices  mean  higher  production 
costs,  necessitating still  higher  farm  product 
prices. Furthermore, recent experience suggests 
that farmland  values  would  increase at  rates 
greater  than  those  projected  by  the  USDA. 
Land  values  increased  at  a  13  per  cent  or 
greater rate in several major agricultural states 
last  year,  despite  problems with  drought and 
depressed farm prices." 
Clearly,  parity  pricing  would  yield 
17 USDA Issue BriejTng  Paper, pp. 12-17. 
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substantial  windfall  gains  to  present  land 
holders as farmers and  nonfarm investors  bid 
up  the  price  of  farmland.  Tenant  farmers 
would benefit immediately from  parity pricing 
as well, but over time would  lose much of  that 
benefit as rental rates for farmland (both share 
and  cash)  increased  to  provide  landlords  a 
market  return  on the rapidly increasing value 
of  farmland.  Just  over  half  of  the  nation's 
current  crop  acreage  is  tenant  farmed. 
Separation  of  ownership  and  operation  of 
farmland  would  likely  increase  as  high land 
prices  make  it  increasingly  difficult  for  new 
entrants  and  tenant farmers  to  purchase 
farmland. Dr. Tweeten sums up the problem in 
this way: "The benefits (of land appreciation as 
a result of  parity pricing) would  be received by 
landowners, many of  whom  are  wealthy. The  , 
result would  be-substantial  transfer  of  wealth 
from  low-income consumers and  taxpayers to 
high-income landowners."  l9 
Output, Farm Size, and 
Individual Freedom 
Any policy that pegs prices at artificially high 
levels will  ultimately have a significant impact 
on the levels of  production and consumption as 
well as on the structure of  the industry. If farm 
prices  were  raised  to  parity  levels  through 
Government  edict,  producers  would  be 
encouraged  to  increase  output  even  though 
supplies are already burdensome. Furthermore, 
the quantities demanded by consumers at home 
and  abroad  would  decline  as  prices  go  up, 
thereby  exacerbating  the  imbalance  between 
market-  supplies  and  demand.  Left  alone, 
stockpiles  would  obviously  grow  by  large 
18 Farm Real Estate Developments. Economics, Statistics, 
and  Cooperative  Services,  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Agriculture, Washington, D.C.. March 1978. 
19 Congressional Research Service, Appendix  1, Statement 
by  Professor Luther Tweeten, Oklahoma State University. 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City amounts.  The  solution  to  this  problem  is 
equally  obvious:  restrictions  on  production 
would have to be imposed. 
The USDA estimates  that nearly 75 million 
acres  of  cropland  would  need  to be  idled  by 
1982  to  bring  supplies  in  line  with  expected 
demand  at  parity  prices.20 This  reduction 
would be about 27 per cent of  the 275 million 
acres planted in wheat, feed grains, cotton, and 
soybeans  in  1977.  Although  part  of  this 
adjustment  reflects  the  need  to  correct  the 
burdensome  supply  situation  that  presently 
exists,  most  of  the  land  would  have  to  be 
removed from  production  because  of  the  new 
price levels. If the USDA,'s  figures are accurate, 
planted  wheat  acreage  in  1982  would  fall  to 
about 45 million acres from the 75 million acres 
planted in 1977. Feed grain and cotton acreage 
would  also have  to drop sharply-perhaps  20 
and 60 per cent, respectively-to support parity 
prices.  However,  soybean  acreage  would  not 
have to fall  much  below  the 1977  level  of  60 
million acres to sustain prices at 100 per cent of 
parity. 
The  impact  of  these  policies  on  livestock 
production should  also be acknowledged.  The 
cattle  industry,  which  has  recorded  relatively 
few  profits  since  1973,  is  now  nearing  the 
completion of  a  liquidation  program  that has 
reduced inventory numbers by 16 million head 
during the past threz years. If grain prices were 
to suddenly go to 100 per cent of  parity levels, 
feed costs would soar and force cattle feeders to 
curtail their feeding programs. Ranchers would 
discover that herd  sizes would  require further 
liquidation.  The  hog  industry  would  also  be 
faced with  a similar situation.  Although these 
production  adjustments  would  push  livestock 
prices  to  profitable  levels  over  time,  the 
hardships suffered  in  the short  run  would  be 
severe. 
20 USDA Issue Briefing Paper, see footnote 13. 
Will farmers make these adjustments volun- 
tarily?  Livestock  producers  will  have  little 
choice but to do so because  of  the price-cost 
squeeze  resulting  from  parity  grain  prices.  If 
earlier  programs  are  any  indication,  crop 
farmers will voluntarily  idle some of  their land 
in  return for  certain economic  considerations. 
But it is  unlikely that they  will, on  their own, 
set  aside 75 million acres for  100  per  cent  of 
parity. At  these price levels, the temptation to 
expand output would  be too difficult to resist. 
Thus, a mandatory form of  controls  would  be 
required  to  reduce  output  to  desired  levels. 
Several  alternatives  are  available,  including 
production quotas, marketing certificates,  and 
acreage  restrictions,  but  inevitably  most 
producers  would  be  giving  up  some  of  their 
decisionmaking prerogatives. 
In  the  final  analysis,  the  parity  concept 
contains a number of  paradoxes, not the least 
of  which  pertains  to  the  structure  of  U.S. 
agriculture. While claims are made that parity 
prices will  preserve family farming, the truth is 
that they will probably have the opposite effect. 
Why?  Because  parity  prices  would  be 
tantamount  to  guaranteed  profits  for  many 
farmers,  especially  the  more  efficient  ones, 
and,  in  this  situation,  these  operators-to- 
gether  with  nonfarm  investors-would  move 
very  quickly  to  buy  up  land.  Although  the 
number  of  part-time  farm  operations  could 
increase, most of  the small- and medium-sized 
farms would  ultimately  disappear,  since  they 
would  be  at  a  competitive  disadvantage  in 
bidding for resources. 
CONCLUSION 
Parity, with its connotations of  fairness and 
equality, has considerable appeal as a  precept 
of  farm policy,  but as  a  working  tool,  it  has 
many shortcomings. The base period 1910-14 is 
so remote that it no longer has much value  as 
an economic  barometer for  agriculture.  Also, 
Economic Review  June 1978 too many things have changed over the past 60 
years  for  agriculture  to  rely  upon  a 'fixed 
formula that totally ignores so many important 
developments. 
Yet  parity  is  not  likely  to  disappear  from 
farm policy jargon. Therefore, if  parity is to be 
more  than  a  symbol  in  farm  policy,  some 
changes  must  be'  made.  For  example,  the 
practice of  expressing parity in terms of  prices 
is  often  criticized.  Several  researchers  have 
suggested  that income  parity  would  be  more 
meaningful.  While there are several  potential 
problems  associated  with  this  approach,  an 
income standard that compares rates of  return 
on  resources  used  in  agriculture  with  the 
earnings  of  similarly  employed  resources 
outside  of  agriculture  is  likely  to  be  more 
representative of  farmers'  economic well-being 
than  parity  prices.  Resources  that  fail  to 
generate  adequate  earnings  in  one  activity 
should  be  shifted  to 'those  areas  where  the 
income potential is  higher.  Adopting a  parity 
standard  that  recognizes  the  basic  funda- 
mentals  of  a  market  economy  would  be  a 
positive step in farm policymaking. 
Though the advocates of  parity  prices have 
good  intentions,  it  is  clear  that  farm  policy 
cannot--or at least should not-be  formulated 
on the basis of  a  few  statistics  and  simplistic 
formulas. Agriculture is  much too complex to 
have all of its ills cured by a single prescription. 
Professor  Harold  F.  Breimyer  has  issued  a 
useful warning about the proper role of  parity 
as a policy goal.  He  states that, "To  build  a 
farm  program  on  it  [parity]  in  mechanical 
fashion would be to disregard all that has been 
learned since 1933 about  how  carefully farm 
programs must be tailored to circumstances of 
any given  time."21 The lessons from  the past 
should  not  be  forgotten.  In  the  1950's  and 
19601s, farm  prices  were  supported  at 
artificially high levels, with  the result that too 
many  resources  were  committed  to  the 
production of  too  much  food.  The  stockpiles 
were  finally  reduced  in  time,  but  only  at 
substantial'cost  to tax pay el;^.  If  policymakers 
and farm leaders become enamored once more 
with  the  idea  of  solving  the  farm  income 
problem with parity prices, the mistakes of  the 
past are destined to be repeated. 
21,~arold  , F:  Breimyer,  "Parity-That  Word  Again," 
Economic  and  Marketing  Information for  Missouri 
Agriculture,  University  of Missouri-Columbia,  Vol.  21, 
No. 2, February 1978, p.'4. 
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